Abstract
Introduction
With the rapid development of multimedia communication technology, wireless mobile terminals, such as PAD and smartphones, are no longer just for calls and SMS, and instead, become especially popular nowadays for transmission or storage of multimedia data, such as images and videos, which forms the privacy of users. To ensure their security, such sensitive data needs to be protected in transmission or storage. One seemingly viable approach to protecting multimedia information is to reject unauthorized access according to authentication control mechanisms. However, it cannot effectively ensure the physical security of multimedia information. Another straightforward approach is to encrypt the entire compressed bitstream with a conventional cryptographic algorithm, such as DES [1] or AES [2] . However, video data (even compressed bitstream) generally possesses a huge volume and requires real-time operations. Moreover, in the case of the wireless mobile terminals, limited processing power, memory and bandwidth is rarely able to meet the heavy encryption processing overhead. Therefore, according to the specific characteristics for resource-limited systems, new video encryption algorithms need to be carefully designed.
In real-world applications, a video encryption algorithm should take various requirements into account, which include security, computational efficiency, compression efficiency, format compliance and so forth. Different video applications require variable levels of security. For example, for Video on Demand (VoD) or pay-TV, low security is required, and sometimes, even nonpaying users are allowed to access low-quality versions to promote them to buy high-quality versions, whereas for military secrets or financial information, strict security is demanded to completely prevent unauthorized access. The computational efficiency means that the encryption or decryption process can not cause too much time delay, in order to meet the requirements of real-time applications. Video compression is employed to reduce the storage space and save bandwidth, so that the encryption process should have the least impact on the compression efficiency. The format compliance, also known as syntax-compliance [3] , means that the encryption algorithm should do not change the compressed bitstream format, which ensures features like cutting, copying, adding or removing, and ability of the encrypted bitstream still can be decoded by a standard decoder. All in all, a well-designed video encryption algorithm should provide sufficient security, high computational efficiency, impose little impact on the compression efficiency, and meanwhile maintain the format compliance.
In the past decades, a number of video encryption algorithms have been proposed. According to their association with video compression, these algorithms can be classified into joint compression and encryption algorithms and compression-independent encryption algorithms [4] . For the former one, the encryption algorithms are embedded in a certain step of the video compression process. For example, some algorithms permute or scramble the DCT coefficients after the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [5] - [7] , Some algorithms encrypt the signs of DCT coefficients or motion vector difference (MVD) after quantization [8] , [9] , and some algorithms selectively encrypt intra-prediction modes, DCT coefficients, and MVDs during the entropy coding [10] - [12] . These algorithms maintain the format compliance after encryption, but all of them require a modified structure of the standard video codec, leaving all existing codec useless. In addition, the compression efficiency is usually degraded by permuting or scrambling the DCT coefficients during the coding process.
Differently, for compression-independent encryption algorithms, the compression and encryption process are carried out separately, which usually refers to the encryption of the compressed bitstream. Therefore, it is also known as compressed domain encryption. In [13] , the odd indexed bytes in compressed bitstream are firstly encrypted with a conventional cryptographic algorithm, and then used as keys to XOR with the even indexed bytes. In [14] , the compressed bitstream are divided into five types, according to their importance for decoding, and the first three are encrypted whereas others remain unchanged. Both of the above algorithms provide satisfying security, but are of low computational efficiency and loss the format compliance. In [3] , the codewords of DCT coefficients and MVDs in compressed bitstream are shuffled. In [15] , the codewords of intra-prediction modes are encrypted. Both of them demonstrate high computational efficiency and maintain the format compliance, but are of low security. As can be seen, the various existing compressed domain encryption algorithms cannot optimize the tradeoff between security and computational complexity, and hardly maintain the format compliance. Therefore, the compressed domain video encryption algorithms need to be further studied.
In this paper, we propose a video encryption algorithm in H.264 compressed domain for resource-limited systems. In order to optimize the tradeoff between security and computational complexity, only the codewords which are the most critical to decoded video quality are encrypted. For intra-macroblocks, the codewords of intra-prediction modes, DC coefficients (DCs) and low frequency AC coefficients (ACs) in H.264 bitstream are encrypted, and for intermacroblocks, only the codewords of DCs and MVDs are encrypted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes the H.264 bitstream syntax structure. Details of the proposed video encryption algorithm are described in Section III. The algorithm's performance, such as security, computational efficiency and memory requirement, is discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
H.264 bitstream syntax structure
H.264 is the latest video coding standard of ITU-T and ISO/IEC [16] . Compared with the previous standards, such as H.261, H.263 and MPEG4, it has a "network-friendly" structure and enhanced compression performance. Therefore, with the continuous promotion of multimedia services, H.264 has been widely used in real-world applications.
In H.264 bitstream, the header information includes Sequence Parameter Set (SPS), Picture Parameter Set (PPS), slice header and macroblock header. Among them, SPS contains sequence parameter set ID, profile and level, the number of reference frames, picture width and height, and so on. PPS contains picture parameter set ID, SPS, entropy coding mode, reference frame index, the initial quantization parameter, and so on. Slice header contains slice type, SPS and PPS, the address of slice's first macroblock, and so on. As can be seen, although the header information plays a key role in decoding video correctly and controls the video synchronization, it does not contain any video information itself. In addition, the header information generally has a fixed syntax, and can be rebuilt easily by skilled attackers. Therefore, the header information encryption cannot provide sufficient security.
The following part after the header information contains macroblock data, which can be divided into intra-macroblock data (including macroblock type, intra-prediction modes, coded block pattern and DCT coefficients) and inter-macroblock data (including macroblock type, inter-prediction modes, coded block pattern, MVDs and DCT coefficients). Among them, DCT coefficients contain video texture information, MVDs contain video dynamic information, and intra-prediction mode indicates the predicted direction in each mode, where the intra4×4 has 9 predicted directions (Vertical, Horizontal, DC, Vertical_Left, Diagonal_Down_Left, Vertical_Right, Diagonal_Down_Right, Horizontal_Down and Horizontal_Up) and the intra16×16 has 4 predicted directions (Vertical, Horizontal, DC and Plane). All these information are the most important for the decoded video quality. However, as pointed out in [11] , due to the fact that attackers can recover the encrypted video with replacement attacks, it is not secure to merely encrypt DCT coefficients or intra-prediction modes, as shown in Figure  1 . In addition, some useful video information may be leaked out by using the motion vector [17] . Therefore, in order to obtain high security, the intra-prediction modes, DCT coefficients, and MVDs in H.264 bitstream should be encrypted at the same time. 
The proposed encryption algorithm
Based on the above analysis, for intra-macroblocks, the codewords of intra-prediction mode, DCs and low frequency ACs in H.264 bitstream are extracted for encryption, and for intermacroblocks, the codewords of DCs and MVDs are extracted for encryption. In order to maintain the format compliance, the codewords of intra-prediction mode are encrypted with IPME algorithm [15] , the codewords of DCs are suffix encrypted based on CAVLC, and the codewords of low frequency intra-macroblocks' ACs and MVDs are sign encrypted. The proposed encryption algorithm is shown in Figure 2 . 
Key generation
Multimedia compressed bitstream is often transmitted or distributed over wireless channel, in which bit-error or packet-loss often occurs. Furthermore, the lost-packets may be encrypted. Thus, unless the encryption algorithm takes enough control over synchronization between the bitstream and the cipher, the encrypted bitstream will fail to be decrypted, even if the original key is known. In order to relax the sensitivity to packet-loss, the H.264 bitstream is encrypted slice by slice in the proposed algorithm.
AES [2] is the next generation encryption standard to replace DES. It is capable of using cryptographic keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits in encryption. Due to its security, simplicity and flexibility, AES has been widely used in various kinds of platforms. In addition, AES can be operated as a stream cipher in the OFB (Output Feedback Block) mode, and the key expansion in AES is utilized to generate multiple keys instead of the original key. Thus, AES is very suitable for the proposed encryption algorithm.
According to the H.264 bitstream syntax structure, we propose to encrypt it slice by slice with multiple keys which are generated by AES OFB. Therefore, the packet-loss affects only the current slice, but not the subsequent ones.
Intra-prediction mode encryption
In H.264 bitstream, the intra4×4 prediction mode is denoted by two syntax elements, prev_intra4×4_pred_mode_flag with 1 bit and rem_intra4×4_pred_mode with 3 bits. If the prev_intra4×4_pred_mode_flag is set to '1', the current block uses the most probable mode, which is the minimum of the prediction modes of its two neighboring upper and left blocks, and the rem_intra4×4_pred_mode is not adopted. Otherwise, the prev_intra4×4_pred_mode_flag is set to '0', and the current block's prediction mode is presented by the rem_intra4×4_pred_mode.
In IPME algorithm [15] , only the codewords of the rem_intra4×4_pred_mode in H.264 bitstream are encrypted. The algorithm is simple and computationally efficient, but lacks of security due to the limited encryption space. In the improved algorithm [18] , in order to obtain higher security, when the prev_intra4×4_pred_mode_flag is set to '1', the encryption operation is to reset it to '0' and inserts 3 bits chaotic sequence as the rem_intra4×4_pred_mode, and all the intra4×4 prediction modes are encrypted by chaotic pseudo random sequence. However, the improved algorithm significantly increases the computational complexity, and bears a large amount of processing overhead and memory requirements. Thus, the codewords of intra4×4 prediction modes are encrypted with IPME in the proposed algorithm.
For intra16×16 blocks, the prediction mode is encoded differently from the intra4×4 cases. It is combined with the CBP (Coded Block Pattern), and encoded by the unsigned Exp-Golomb entropy coding. The CBP indicates which blocks within a macroblock contain DCT coefficients, so that its values should not be changed during encryption, otherwise the encrypted bitstream will lose the format compliance. Fortunately, as shown in Table 1 , encrypting the codewords' last one bit of intra16×16 prediction mode does not change the value of CBP, meanwhile maintains the format compliance. Thus, for intra16 × 16 prediction mode, the codewords' last one bit is encrypted in the proposed algorithm. 
DCT coefficients encryption
The DCT coefficients in H.264 baseline profile are encoded with the context-based adaptive variable length coding (CAVLC). The encoding process can be described as follows [16] :  Encoding the number of coefficients and trailing ones (coeff_token),  Encoding the sign of each trailing ones,  Encoding the levels of the remaining non-zero coefficients,  Encoding the total number of zeros before the last coefficient, and  Encoding each run of zeros. Since it is context adaptive, the choice of VLC table to encode each level adapts to the magnitude of each successive coded level. Therefore, in order to maintain the format compliance, the context adaptive property should not be destroyed. In other words, the magnitude of coded levels should not be changed. Thus, only the sign bits of coded level in H.264 bitstream can be encrypted. Note that the level of each remaining non-zero coefficient in the block is encoded in reverse order, starting with the highest frequency and working back towards the DC coefficient. Thus, changing the magnitude of the DC coefficient has no impact on the context adaptive property.
Therefore, by taking security, computational complexity, and format compliance into account, the codewords' suffix of intra/inter-macroblocks' DCs and the codewords' sign bits of the three low frequency intra-macroblocks' ACs in H.264 bitstream are encrypted in the proposed algorithm.
MVD encryption
In H.264, each MVD is independently coded by the signed Exp-Golomb entropy coding. It means that the codewords of MVDs in H.264 bitstream have no dependency. Therefore, scrambling the codewords or encrypting the codewords' suffix of MVDs, the encrypted bitstream remains format compliance. However, the scrambling requires a large amount of memory and the suffix encryption is usually of high computational complexity. Therefore, only the codewords' sign bits of MVDs are encrypted in the proposed algorithm. Figure 3 shows the encryption results of the MVDs' sign. As can be seen, the encrypted videos' dynamic information is chaotic. 
Performance analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, three typical standard sequences, i.e Football, Mobile and Foreman, are selected for testing. In the evaluation, the baseline profile of H.264 JM 86 is used, the total frame number is 50 with a frame rate 15 Hz, and the intra-frame period is 15 frames. The proposed algorithm's performance, such as security, computational complexity and memory requirement, is analyzed as follow.
Security 1) Perception security
If the videos encrypted with an encryption algorithm are too chaotic to be understood, then the encryption algorithm is regarded as of high perception security [11] . Figure 4 shows the three encrypted videos decoded with a standard H.264 decoder in subjective quality. As can be seen, by encrypting the most critical bits in H.264 bitstream, the encrypted videos appear unrecognizable at all. Furthermore, the three encrypted videos quality expressed in PSNR are illustrated in Figure 5 . As can be seen, the encrypted videos' PSNRs are much lower than the corresponding unencrypted video, and the difference is about 25 dB. Thus, the proposed algorithm can achieve a high perception security. 
2) Perceptual attacks
The video encryption algorithms have to withstand not only classical cryptanalytic attacks, such as known-plaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks and ciphertext attacks, but also the perceptual attacks, such as error-concealment-based attacks [3] and replacement attacks [10] . The error-concealment-based attacks means that attackers treat the encrypted parts as the loss caused by bit-error or packet-loss and recover them using error-concealment techniques. The replacement attacks means that attackers replace the encrypted parts with arbitrary data and makes the encrypted video recognizable. Figure 6 shows the encrypted videos recovered by error-concealment-based attacks and replacement attacks. As can be seen, all of the recovered videos are still unrecognizable. Thus, the proposed algorithm is immune to the perceptual attacks. 
3) Brute-force attacks
Since the AES key lengths support 128, 192 and 256 bits, the minimum brute-force space for each slice is 2 128 , which is too large for attackers to break. Thus, some attackers try to recover intraprediction modes, DCT coefficients and MVDs' sign bits with brute-force attacks. In the proposed algorithm, the brute-force space of intra prediction mode, DC coefficient and the sign bits of AC and MVD is 2 3 , 2 R (R is the length of the codewords' suffix of DC) and 2 2 , respectively. Therefore, for a slice with M intra-macroblocks and N inter-macroblocks, the brute-force space is
. . Thus, the brute-force space is also large enough to withstand attacks.
Computational complexity
The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm depends on the extraction and encryption of the codewords of intra-prediction modes, DCT coefficients and MVDs. As can be seen from section II, according to the syntax structure, slice header, macroblock header for each slices and each macroblocks' data in H.264 bitstream can be quickly located. Thus, the extraction process does not take a lot of time. Furthermore, due to AES can be operated as a stream cipher in the OFB mode, encrypting intra-prediction modes, DCs' suffix and the sign bits of ACs and MVDs does not cost much time. The computational efficiency of the proposed algorithm (PVEA) and the SEAH264 algorithm [11] are given in Table 2 . As can be seen, for the proposed algorithm, the time ratio of encryption/compression is no more than 1%, and the time ratio of decryption/decompression is only about 5%. Moreover, the proposed algorithm is more time efficient than the SEAH264 algorithm. Thus, the proposed algorithm is less computationally expensive. 
Memory requirement
Generally speaking, the larger amount of data is processed in encryption, the more memory is required. Therefore, the memory requirement of the proposed algorithm can be measured by the amount of the encrypted data. Figure 7 shows the ratio between the encrypted data and the corresponding slice data. As can be seen, for intra-frames, the encrypted data is over 10% of the corresponding slice data, and for inter-frames, the ratio is less than 10%. That is because, considering intra-frames are more important than inter-frames, the proposed algorithm provides enhanced encryption to this kind of information. All in all, compared with the existing encryption algorithms, the proposed algorithm adds less overhead of memory requirement.
Figure 7.
The ratio between the encrypted data and the slice data versus frame number.
Conclusion
In this paper, a novel video encryption algorithm in H.264 compressed domain is proposed, which is independent of the compression process and does not need to modify the structure of a standard video codec. In order to reduce the processing overhead and memory requirement, the proposed algorithm only encrypts the codewords of intra-prediction modes, the codewords' suffix of intra/inter-macroblocks' DCs, and the codewords' sign bits of three low frequency intra-macroblocks' ACs and MVDs in H.264 bitstream. By optimizing the tradeoff between security and computational complexity, it not only achieves reliable security, resists perceptual
